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THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS
CONRAD WOLF

On Flag Day, 1922, a United States Senator, addressing a
meeting of the American Federation of Labor, denounced the
exercise by the Supreme Court of the United States of the power
to declare an Act of Congress void because unconstitutional, as
a pure usurpation on the part of the court. This was a grave
charge. A review of the history of the making of the constitution will, however, show that this statement of the United
States Senator is without foundation. The Senator either ignored history, or was unaware of its existence. The convention
that met in Independence Hall and framed the Constitution certainly knew its intention as to what powers the Constitution
should give to the Supreme Court.
An examination of Madison's Journal of this convention will
show that this question was fully understood and discussed in
the convention. Strange to say it will also show that the discussion of the question arose, as an incident to the discussion of
the question of what measure should be placed in the Constituto prevent Congress (the very body to which the Senator
belonged) from having the absolute and sole power to make laws
because it was feared by all that the legislative branch would be
the tyrannical branch of government. The fundamental basis
of the Constitution was that the legislature should be confined
to the legislative power, the executive to the executive power,
and the judicial to the judicial power. It was feared that the
legislative power might pass laws which would destroy the other
branches of the government. This was one of the most serious
questions discussed in the convention, and it was in this convention that the question as to the right of the Supreme Court to
pass upon the constitutionality of laws was discussed.
Resolution Number Eight that was before the constitutional
convention reads "Resolved that the Executive and a convenient
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number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of
Revision with authority to examine every Act of the National
Legislature before it shall operate, and every Act of a particular
legislature before a negative thereon shall be final; and that
the dissent of said council shall amount to a rejection, unless
the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of
a particular legislature be again negatived by ------ of the
members of each branch." In discussing this proposition on
the 4th day of June, 1787, Madison's Journal shows this: "Mr.
Gerry doubts whether the judiciary ought to form a part of it
(the Council of Revision) as they will have a sufficient check
against encroachments on their own department by their ex.position of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their
constitutionality. In some states the judges had actually set
aside laws as being against the Constitution. This was done,
too, with general approbation." Nobody disputed or questioned
the statement of Mr. Gerry as to a court's right to declare laws
unconstitutional. It was decided, however, to give the President a veto upon any law passed by Congress, and requiring that
in order that any law so vetoed, before it could become effective,
should again be passed by a two-thirds vote of each house. On
the 6th day of June, Mr. Wilson moved to reconsider which was
lost after considerable debate. The question, however, was not
left to rest here, for on July 21, 1787, Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania moved that "The Supreme National Judiciary should be
associated with the executives in the revisionary power." This
is the power to revise the laws before they should become effective. He admitted that this had been passed on before. "But
upon reflection he thought that it should be passed upon again,
that the legislative department was not sufficiently limited in
its power to pass laws." He used these words: "It had been
said that the judges as expositors of the laws would have an
opportunity of defending their constitutional rights. There was
weight in this observation, but this power of the judges did not
go far enough. Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be
dangerous, may be destructive and yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the judges in refusing to give them effect."
Madison threw the weight of his powerful influence in favor of
further curbing the legislative department, using these words:
"It would be useful to the judiciary department by giving it an
additional opportunity of defending itself against legislative
"It was much more to be apprehended that
encroachments."
notwithstanding this co-operation of the two departments (Executive and Judiciary) the Legislature would still be an over-
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match to them. Experience in all the states had evinced a power-

ful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its
vortex. This was the source of real danger to the American Con-

stitution, and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive
authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican principles." On the same day Mr. Luther Martin, widely
known as a great lawyer, opposed the making of the judges a
part of the Judiciary power using these words: "And as to
the constitutionality of laws, that point will come before the
judges in their proper official character. In this character they
have a negative on the laws. Join them with the Executive in
the revision and they will have a double negative. It is necessary that the Supreme Judiciary should have the confidence of
the people. This will soon be lost if they .are employed in the
task of remonstrating against popular measures of the Legislature." On the same day Colonel Mason advocating that the
judges should be included in the revisionary power used these
words: "Notwithstanding the precautions taken in the Constitution of the Legislature, it would still so much resemble that
of the individual states, that it must be expected frequently to
pass unjust and pernicious laws. This restraining power was
therefore essentially necessary. It would have the effect of not
only hindering the final passage of such laws, but would discourage demagogues from attempting to pass them." He then referred to what had been said about the judges having the double
negative and said: "He would reply that in this capacity (that
is as judges), they could impede in one case only the operation
of the law. They could declare an unconstitutionallaw void. But
with regard to every law, however unjust, oppressive, or pernicious, which did not come plainly under this description, they
would be under the necessity as judges to give it a free course."
On the same day Mr. Ghoram used this language: "All agree that
a check on the Legislature is necessary." Mr. Rutledge used these
words opposing the admission of the judges to the revisionary
council: "The judges ought never to give their opinion on a
law until it comes before them." The resolution to join the
Judiciary with the President as to a veto of laws was lost on
this day but the question would not down. On August 15th, the
question again came up on motion made by Mr. Madison to include the judges in the veto power. On that day was heard for
the first time any statement criticising as to the power of the
court to declare a law unconstitutional. Mr. Mercer on that
day approved the motion of Mr. Madison to include the judges
in the veto power because he said the true policy is that legisla-
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tive usurpation and oppression may be obviated. "He disapproved of the doctrine that the judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He thought
laws ought to be well and cautiously made and then to be uncontrollable," but only because the judges would already have
had their say. The motion was lost. Immediately following this
Governeur Morris again commenced the discussion. Mr. Dickenson then used this language: "He was strongly impressed
with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the judges
to set aside a law. He thought no such power ought to exist.
He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute."
Governeur Morris suggested the expedient of an absolute veto in
the Executive. He could not agree that the Judiciary which was
part of the Executive should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law. A control over,the Legislature might have its inconveniences but he viewed the danger on
the other side. The most virtuous citizens will often as members
of a legislative body concur in measures which afterwards in
their private capacity they will be ashamed of." These references to Madison's Journal show that it was clearly understood
by the members of the constitutional convention that the courts
would have the power to declare laws unconstitutional. No steps
whatever were taken to check, destroy, or prevent the exercise
of this power and the Constitution went to the people with this
full understanding.
The Federalist consists of eighty-five letters addressed to the
people of the State of New York, in which state there was the
most strenuous opposition to the adoption of the Constitution.
Before the last letters of the Federalist were published in the
newspapers, they were published in the edition of "McClean."
The last of this publication was on May 28, 1788. The State of
New York did not ratify the Constitution until the 26th day of
July, 1788, so that the 78th number of the Federalist had been
before the public for two months. This letter was written by
Hamilton who was a member of the constitutional convention.
In answer to the critics of the proposed Constitution, Hamilton
said that some "perplexity had arisen as to the rights of the
court to pronounce legislative acts void because contrary to the
Constitution. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the
American constitutions a brief discussion of the ground on which
it is based cannot be unacceptable. There is no position which
depends on clearer principles than that every act of delegated
authority contrary to the tenor of the commission under which
it is exercised is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to
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the Constitution can be valid." For United States Senators to
now say that the power was usurped because it was never intended that the Supreme Court should have the right and the
power to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional or void,
is preposterous in the extreme, and the best answer to all arguments advanced in favor of now taking away that power, are
embodied in letter 78 of the Federalist, which should be read
by every American citizen. There the dangers to liberty, growing out of encroachment by the legislative power of Congress,
are clearly pointed out and are so clearly applicable to present
day tendencies, that they must not be overlooked. The very fact
that members of Congress have been in the last few years laboring to have the people so change the Constitution that the Supreme Court shall be deprived of the power we are considering,
makes it clear that this movement puts Congress in the attitude
of seeking to shake off its own limitation, and in the words of
Madison, of Congress "evincing a powerful tendency to absorb
all power into its own vortex."
All of us should open our eyes to the fact that the principal
thing sought by the objectors now is not to deprive the Supreme
Court of a power that it has enjoyed and possessed during all the
period of our national existence, but to give to Congress powers
which it has never had and which the fathers considered dangerous for it to have. It is the tearing down of the bulwarks
of liberty and giving the Legislature the power to pass whatever laws it pleases giving it the supreme power without any
limitation except that of the veto of the President. The next
step would be to abolish that veto.
It seems presumptuous on the part of members of Congress
to thus claim that it is best for the people and for all the future
generations, that Congress should have the absolute power, not
only to make, but to interpret the laws, unchecked by any other
department of Government. Senators, who a short time ago
were making this proposition, forgot the very fundamentals of
our Government. They forget that our Government is one of
limited powers, that it was never intended that Congress should
be supreme in the making of laws, but that its power in making
,aws was limited; that it was only an agent. In other words, the
Senators forgot the pit from which the power of Congress was
digged.
We should not fall into that class who believe that the Constitution of the United States is the sum and end of all human
perfection and so sacred and divine that it cannot be changed
in any particular. The Constitution itself speaks upon this sub-

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

ject. The most informing article in the Constitution is Article
Five (5) which provides that the Constitution may be amended;
for the power to amend is the most important power granted or
withheld within all the limits of the Constitution. Here we get
a glimpse of a power that is sometimes ignored and especially
by the Senator concerning whom we have been speaking. Who
may amend this Constitution? Surely not Congress, surely not
the Executive, surely not the Judicial Department. These words
reveal back of this Constitution, higher than any branch of Government created by it, a power that stands above all othersthe power and majesty of the American people. Congress is
only a limited agent of this power that stands supreme. The
President with all his powers is only an agent. The judges of
the Supreme Court are only agents. Each one of these departments are limited to particular things, by this Constitution. The
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution contains these words
which throw further light upon this majestic power that stands
above the Constitution. "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the state are
reserved to the states respectively or to the people." When the
people of the United States created a Congress, they gave to it
only limited powers. They gave it no Judicial function and intended that it should have none, but even limited its powers to
make the laws, because they were fearful of the usurpation of
the legislative department. It was recognized on all sides that
under a government, with powers limited by a written Constitution, it was within the power and the duty of the Judiciary, to
pass upon laws enacted by the legislative department, when concrete human rights were in the balance before the court. If
Congress should now be invested with the power to pass upon
the constitutionality of the laws of its own making, what would
be to hinder it from making and interpreting laws that would
destroy the powers of the Judicial Department?
When the rights of two persons are in controversy and are at
stake, before some tribunal to be settled, the function to settle
the same is a judicial function not a legislative one. Speaking
with all due respect of the objectors to the Supreme Court, is
not any attempt to lead the people to believe, that their rights
have been taken away from them by the Supreme Court, because Congress is deprived of the right to pass upon these very
controversies, the artifice of the demagogue?
Many people assume that as soon as a law is passed by Congress, the Supreme Court in its superior wisdom proceeds to
examine it, and say whether or not it is constitutional, or un-

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

constitutional; that the court passes upon all laws in this manner. It should be made plain that the courts have assumed no
such authority; that no court has the jurisdiction or the power
to take any Act of Congress or of any Legislature, examine it
and pronounce upon it, and that no court has ever attempted to
exercise any such authority. The courts exercise authority over
individual parties to an actual controversy, where actual and
real rights will be affected by the judgment rendered. The declaring that a law is unconstitutional is only an incident in arriving at a decision as to concrete rights.
In the famous case of Fletcher vs. Peck, Justice Johnson, in
speaking of the duties of the Supreme Court of the United
States, uses this meaningful language: "It is our duty to decide
on the rights but not on the speculation of parties."
In the halls of Congress where the Legislative function is being exercised, there are discussions about general rules, what
the law ought to be, what rules generally shall be established, for
the government of certain procedure or certain rights. There
are no individual rights before the legislators. They are looking
only to generalities. No legislator, from Moses to the present
day, has ever been wise enough to see in advance just how any
law would work in actual operation, when it comes in contact
with concrete individuals, who have concrete rights. No legislative body should have the right to decide in advance, that its
general ideas, its general principles, the general laws and rules,
that it sets down, should be construed so and so when it comes
in contact with other rules, with other rights, which have been
equally and as solemnly enacted and with as good intentions.
This can only be done when the conflict comes and the function
to do this is a Judicial function.
On the other hand when we step into the court room, we are
far away from these generalities, we are now in the presence
of concrete things. John Doe and Richard Roe, living individuals, have rights, which have come into conflict. Which one shall
prevail? John Doe claims that under a certain law of Congress
he is entitled to prevail, that the Supreme Legislature of the
land has declared what the law is. Under this law, his rights
are plain, but Richard Roe claims, notwithstanding this law,
there are other laws and especially that there is a law passed,
adopted and ratified, by the people themselves who are above
their agent, the legislative body and under this law, he should
prevail in the controversy. The particular facts in controversy
are new. There have never been any like them before. These
facts could not have been before Congress when it adopted law.
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What is the court to do-say that a law enacted by the agent
of the people is greater than the law that is enacted by the people themselves?
The United States Senator, and those who take the same view
that he did, seem to imagine under such circumstances as this,
that the real thing in controversy is a dispute between Congress and the Court, but Congress is not a party to the controversy. It has not been hailed into court by any summons,
its rights are not involved. It can still legislate as it did before.
It is not prevented from passing any kind of legislative act it
thinks proper. The sole question before the court under these
circumstances is, what are the rights of John Doe and Richard
Roe? How shall these concrete rights be decided? If the court
decides in favor of Richard Roe because his rights are guarded
by the law, passed by the people, not by its agent, why should
the Legislature feel that it has been curtailed in any of its
powers?
In the Seventy-eighth Federalist, Hamilton uses these words:
"Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the
power of the people is superior to both; and that where the
will of the Legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges
ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former."
The people never intended that Congress should have any
such power as is now sought for it, and the agent of the people
selected by them, to pass upon this question should not be
criticised on account of the jealousies of another agent, which
has never been given such power as is now sought for it. Most
people do not stop to think that if the parties in a law suit should
get together, and compromise before the case is decided, that
the court would at once dismiss the case, even though the parties
desire a decision to guide them in the future. Courts have no
jurisdiction of what would be the parties' rights, under circumstances which are not before the court.
In passing upon constitutional questions, the Supreme Court
and all Supreme Courts have laid down these rules for themselves from which they have never varied.
1. There must be actual parties before the court, with an
actual controversy, with rights actually to be decided, not mere
speculations or intellectual disputes. It must be where personal
rights or property rights are actually to be decided and affected
by the judgment.
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2. The court will presume that the Congress has kept within
its constitutional limitations, and will resolve every reasonable
doubt in favor of the constitutionality of the law.
3. The court will give such construction to the law, as to
bring it within the terms of the Constitution, if that can reasonably be done, rather than to give it a construction that will make
it unconstitutional.
4. The court will not state what the law ought to be but what
the rights of individual parties are.
5. The court will not inquire into the motives or the reasons
of the Legislature for passing a law. It will not undertake to
determine the wisdom or the policy of the law, but will take it
as it finds it, written by Congress. That it will decide no political question, that it will leave motives and political questions to
the Legislature itself.
6. Congress has the power to pass any tyrannical oppressive
or unjust laws, and the same will be law, unless they come in
conflict with some law plainly established or plainly implied in
the Constitution adopted by the people. It will not declare a law
unconstitutional, because it is unjust, oppressive or tyrannical.
The court has no jurisdiction to do this and so long as Congress
keeps within the limit set by the Constitution, its acts are law
no difference how tyrannical.
Has the Supreme Court ever abused this power, has it ever
used this power to destroy the rights of any other branch of
Government, or to take power unto itself, or has it kept faith
with the people? The trouble with many of the opponents of
the court is, not that the court has been wrong in declaring a
law unconstitutional, but that it has declared laws unconstitutional, which the objectors think are in the interests of humanity, and are best for the people, but they forget that it is not
the duty of the court to pass upon these questions of policy at
all. It may be that some laws have been declared unconstitutional, which are humane, proper and right, but which under
the constitution, Congress has no power to pass.
The Supreme Court held the child labor law, passed by Congress, unconstitutional. The unthinking said and no doubt
thought that the court was guided by brutal and unjust sentiments in favor of greedy employers. This question was not
before the court. In passing upon the case, the Supreme Court
decided, that it was unconstitutional for Congress to pass this
law, not because it was just or humane, but because the Constitution did not give Congress the power to pass such a law, be-
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cause Congress was an agent that had not been entrusted with
that power, that under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution this power had been reserved to the people and to the states.
There is not a state in the Union that cannot pass a Child Labor
Act as good and wholesome as that of Congress. Most of the
states do have such acts. The Supreme Court merely decided this
power resided in the states and in the people and not in Congress. It is not a decision against the children, it is merely
pointing out where the jurisdiction lies to make the laws.
It is urged that the Supreme Court should not have the power
to hold an act of Congress void, unless the court is unanimous,
or at least seven of the nine judges concur. This idea ignores
the fact that the court does not sit to pass upon the constitutionality of laws, but to decide the personal or property rights of the
parties before it.
John Doe claims under an act of Congress; Richard Roe
under another act of Congress. The two laws are in conflict in the minds of the majority. If Richard Roe has the
majority of the court he wins. Why should he not? Again John
Doe claims under an act of Congress; Richard Roe claims under
the Constitution. The two are in conflict in the view of the majority. Richard Roe has the majority, but not seven or nine of
the judges, he loses his property, John Doe wins with the
minority, why? The statement of the result shows the absurdity
of the proposal.
The Constitution is a handicap to Richard Roe.
Upon the question as to whether or not the Supreme Court
has sought to grasp power to itself, we respectfully refer to the
case of Marbury vs. Madison, the first case in which the Supreme
Court actually declared a law unconstitutional. As well known,
this was a suit brought by Marbury, who had been appointed a
Justice of the Peace, against James Madison, Secretary of State,
to compel him to deliver the commission signed by the President
commissioning Marbury to be a Justice. The question before
the court, or one of the questions was, did the court have the
right to mandate the Secretary of State? Congress had passed
a law giving to the Supreme Court of the United States the right
to issue a writ of mandamus against any officer of the United
States to compel him to perform a ministerial duty.
The Supreme Court in this case decided that this law gave no
authority to the Supreme Court because Congress had no power
under the Constitution to give to the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction, in addition to that given by the Constitution. Here
the court refused to take unto itself the power which had been
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granted it by the legislative department. Surely it cannot be
said in this case that the court was grasping for power.
In exercising the function of declaring a law unconstitutional,
the court is exercising the same function that it does in passing
upon any other two conflicting laws. There may be two laws
passed by the same Legislature which are in conflict with each
other. In an actual trial the court decides which one is actually the law under the particular circumstances. Nobody has
ever denied this right of the court and the Legislature has never
felt offended by it, but it is only when the Legislature feels that
the court has been loyal to the law established by the people,
instead of the one established by its agent, the Legislature, that
jealousy arises. The cases in which the court has passed upon
constitutional questions is too long to be here reviewed. Suffice
it to say that in one hundred thirty-six years, out of the innumerable laws passed by Congress, the Supreme Court has declared only forty-eight unconstitutional. The checks, put in the
Constitution upon the courts, are still there. If the court goes
wrong its members are still subject to impeachment and removal
from office. We dare say that the court has never abused its
powers.
On the other hand what are the things that are being grasped
after now by the United States Senator opposed to the courts
and those who take the same view? Is it not grasping after
power to pass laws which are forbidden by the Constitution?
Are not the fears of our fathers, of legislative usurpation, well
illustrated by the very conditions of the present? Congress is
at present, for almost the first time in our history, being divided
into blocs; the farmer bloc, the labor bloc, and others, dividing
into factions, and parties along the lines of particular pursuits,
particular professions. This is the very essence of the system
of Soviet Russia. Their members of the Government are selected from each group; each representative is looking after the
interests of his particular group. This is exactly the contrary of
the American system. Under the American system, representatives in Congress are selected from geographical divisions of the
country. They are supposed to represent all interests, not merely a few, not merely the particular class to which they may
belong. In fact classes rigid and fixed are the very antithesis of
our constitutional system. The United States Senators opposed
to the court were the very ones who engaged in the establishment of the bloc system. That factions of this kind are dangerous to human liberty, dangerous to Government, was known to
the fathers and caused their gravest fears. This is shown by
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the Tenth Letter of the Federalist, which was written by Madison. The opening sentence of this letter reads: "Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none
deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to
break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their
character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity
to this dangerous vice." Again, "By a faction, I understand a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a
minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community." Again, "a landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and
divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests, forms the principal task of modern legislation,
and involves the spirit of party and faction, in the necessary
and ordinary operation of the government." It was the very
purpose of the Constitution of the United States to have such
checks and balances that no faction, however large, could enact
laws in its own favor, that would oppress the minority. If the
power of the Supreme Courts should now be taken away, when
the spirit of faction as shown by the bloc system is rampant
in Congress, what would there be to hinder the leading faction,
or a combination of the leading factions representing different
interests, from passing laws in their own interests, which they
would have the absolute power to say are constitutional, although
in plain violation of the rights of the minority secured and intended to be secured by the Constitution? Is it not this impatience, with restraint, on the part of the factions guided by
this self-interest, that is the cause of the criticism of the Supreme Court now? Is it not the desire to be free from restraint
that is causing this grasping for power on the part of Legislators? What do they desire to do when the restraint is removed,
unless it be to pass laws for interests, which cannot now be
favored by the Legislature? Are not the dangers at this moment
from the legislative department of the Government if relieved
from its limitations and not from the court? What would happen
if the restraint is removed? This is the question that should give
every patriot pause. Was not the Flag Day speech referred to,
made to a particular interest, or what Madison would call a
particular faction, made for the purpose of influencing them,
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to seek to gain power which they do not otherwise have? Power
will ever grasp for more power.
After all, has the time come when the people are ready to
abandon the rights which they have reserved to themselves and
give that power to the legislative branch of the Federal Government? Are they ready to say that this particular branch shall
have the power to settle the limitation and the extent of its own
power without any other force to hinder the work? Are the
people ready to abdicate in favor of Congress?
It has been shown by the enactment of Four Amendments to
the Constitution within seven years, that the people can legislate
and change the fundamental law, or add to it within proper
time to make all parties safe. Why, then should the people themselves abdicate in favor of Congress?
In this time of factions or blocs, with a threatened bloc based
upon religious and racial antipathies, if the power to interpret
the Constitution as well as the laws, is placed in the hands of
the political department of government instead of the judicial
department, what will the great guaranties of religious and civil
liberty, embodied in the Bill of Rights be worth?
Whatever may be said or thought of judges and lawyers for
a century and a third we have lived under the system in which
they have had a leading role. Under their administration,
wrongs have been punished, and human rights vindicated. In
the humblest court rooms, as well as in the greatest in the land,
liberty has always dared to proudly raise her head, and her
voice has been commanding.
When our forefathers crossed the ocean to come to a new land,
among the dearest things, the indispensable things, that they
brought with them were their ideas of law and legal institutions.
Among their most precious possessions were their old dog eared
law books. As the pioneers moved and settled from the Atlantic
seaboard over the mountains, over the plains of the middle west,
over the great plains that were once the Great American Desert,
over the mountains again to the farthest reaches of the continent, in every community established, there went the function
of the judge and the advocate. Everywhere arose the church,
the school and the court house. The principles of justice, contained the dog eared law books carried in wagons, or horseback,
on foot, through the forests, over prairies and mountains, were
the foundation upon which American civilization has been built.
Our institutions have passed through sunshine and through
storms. They have been tried by the bitter wrangles of factions. They have withstood the shock of civil war. Through
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these trials, whoever may have failed, the courts have stood like
a "great rock in a weary land." We may truthfully say to all
the world, the Supreme Court has kept the faith.
When William Tell escaped from the toils of the tyrant, in
the midst of a storm, he raised his hands to his native mountains
"to show they still were free", and exclaimed, "I have heard of
other lands whose greatest storms are as gentle zyphers to these
winds I know, and I have wished me there. But I have heard of
their tyrannies and oppressions, and then I have raised my face
into the teeth of this fierce gale, and said 'blow on, this is the
land of liberty.'"
Poets and orators have sung paeans to the glory of the warrior and the statesmen. No poet has sung the epic of the court
room. The warrior may "mount up with wings of eagles;" the
statesman "may run and not be weary ;" but though the courts
"shall walk," through all the days as guardians of liberty, "they
shall not faint." In the great chorus of the Union their steadfastness enables us to still sing in truth:
"My country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty."

